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REDUCING THE EMPLOYMENT TAX
BURDEN ON TENURE BUYOUTS
JON J. JENSEN*
Colleges and universities have utilized the purchase of faculty tenure
for a variety of reasons ranging from efforts to meet decreased salary
budgets to encouraging the turnover of existing faculty.' In reviewing the
purchase of tenure rights from faculty members, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) has taken the position that payments made to tenured faculty
members for termination of their tenure are subject to the provisions of the
Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA).2 Several institutions chal-
lenged the IRS's position by asserting that payments to terminate tenure
constitute the purchase of a property interest and are therefore not subject to
FICA taxation.3 Resolution of these conflicting positions centers on the
determination of whether the tenure "buy-out" payments represent the
purchase of a property interest, which presumably is not subject to FICA
taxation or whether the payments represent wages, which are subject to
FICA taxation. 4
* Partner, Pearson Christensen, PLLP, 24 North 4th Street, Grand Forks, North Dakota 58203
(701-775-0521); J.D., 1990, University of North Dakota School of Law, Grand Forks, North
Dakota; B.S. Accounting, 1987, Minnesota State University, Mankato, Minnesota. Jensen, along
with his partner Garry Pearson, was counsel for NDSU. The author would like to thank Marie
Murach who politely, but persistently, encouraged the completion of this article.
1. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 601 (8th Cir. 2001). Various factors are
considered by institutions when purchasing the faculty tenure such as past performance, current
salary, curriculum needs, and budget restraints. Id.
2. Id. at 602. Following an audit of North Dakota State University (NDSU), the Internal
Revenue Service assessed deficiencies in FICA taxes on NDSU's purchase of faculty tenure. Id.
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service has formally announced its "nonacquiescence"
to the decision issued by the Eighth Circuit. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 2d
1043 (D.N.D. 1999), affd 255 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 2001); 2001-53 I.R.B. 631 (Dec. 31, 2001). The
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service defines "nonacquiescence" as follows: "although
no further review was sought, the Service does not agree with the holding of the court and,
generally, will not follow the decision in disposing of cases involving other taxpayers." 2001-53
I.R.B. 631. With respect to a decision of a circuit court of appeals, the Commissioner's issuance
of a notice of "nonacquiescence" indicates that the Service will not follow the holding on a
nationwide basis but will recognize the precedential impact of the opinion within the circuit in
which the opinion was issued. Id.
3. See, e.g., N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d at 600-09.
4. Id. As noted by the Eighth Circuit of Appeals, "It]he crux of this case is whether
payments made to tenured faculty, in exchange for which the tenured faculty gave up their tenure
rights, are subject to FICA taxes as defined by the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at 603. The
Eighth Circuit noted that it believed the issue was one of first impression in the federal circuit
courts and that the only case that had previously addressed the issue was an unpublished decision
from the Southern District of Texas. Id. at 604 n.7 (citing Slotta v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., No.
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One institution subjected to the IRS's scrutiny of tenure purchase
transactions was North Dakota State University (NDSU).5 The IRS con-
cluded payments for the purchase of tenure were wages subject to FICA
taxation and thereafter assessed additional FICA taxes. 6 NDSU paid the
assessed taxes, exhausted its administrative remedies, and initiated a refund
suit for the recovery of the additional FICA taxes that had been paid.
7
Following cross motions for summary judgment, the Federal District Court
for the District of North Dakota entered partial judgment in favor of NDSU
after determining payments received by tenured faculty members for the
purchase of a property interest (tenure) were not wages for FICA tax pur-
poses. 8 The district court entered judgment in favor of the Government on
the remaining issue of whether payments made to administrators were
wages subject to the FICA tax. 9 Both parties initiated an appeal from the
decision of the district court.1a The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the decision of the district court in all respects."I
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
NDSU is a publicly-funded institution of higher education located in
Fargo, North Dakota.12 During the tax years at issue, NDSU maintained an
G-93-92, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21205 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1994)). The Eighth Circuit limits the
authoritative value of unpublished decisions. EIGHTH CIR. RULES AND PROC., R. 28A(i).
5. N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d at 600-09.
6. Id. at 602.
7. Id. NDSU has had an on again off again policy with regard to payment of FICA taxes on
the purchase of tenure. Id. at 602. Prior to 1991, the employee's portion of FICA taxes was
withheld from the tenure purchase payments, and NDSU paid the employer's share of the FICA
taxes. Id. After NDSU's payroll department received several inquiries questioning the
applicability of FICA taxes to the tenure purchase payments, NDSU's payroll director and general
counsel researched the issue by reviewing privately published tax law treatises, attempting to
contact the Internal Revenue Service, and initiating contact with the Social Security Admini-
stration. Id. Following this investigation, NDSU stopped both the withholding and payment of
FICA taxes on the tenure purchase payments. Id. In June of 1995, the Internal Revenue Service
assessed deficiencies in FICA taxes for the years 1991 through 1994 as the result of NDSU's
decision to stop withholding and paying FICA taxes on the tenure purchase payments. Id. NDSU
paid the assessment and once again began to withhold and pay FICA taxes on the tenure buyout
payments. Id. Ultimately, NDSU filed a request for an administrative refund of the FICA taxes
for the periods of 1991 through 1997, which was denied by the Internal Revenue Service. Id.
8. N.D. State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1044-45.
9. Id.
10. N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d at 602. The United States appealed the district court's ruling
that payments to tenured faculty members were not wages for FICA purposes because the faculty
members had a recognized property interest in their tenure. Id. NDSU appealed the District
Court's ruling that payments made to administrators who also held tenure rights were deemed
wages for FICA purposes. Id. NDSU conceded at oral argument that non-tenured administrators
were at-will employees and subject to FICA taxation. Id. at 603.
11. Id. at 602-03.
12. N.D. State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
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early retirement program for tenured professors and high level admini-
strators. 13
The early retirement program served as a management tool to be used
to make personnel changes.' 4 NDSU used the program to deal with bud-
getary problems, curriculum needs, and occasionally to encourage indi-
viduals to terminate employment when there was insufficient cause for
dismissal.15 NDSU has utilized the early retirement program more fre-
quently when budgets have been tight. 16
Eligibility for the early retirement program is defined by the North
Dakota Board of Higher Education Policy § 703.1 and NDSU Policy §
360.17 Participation in the early retirement program "is not an entitlement
but requires mutual agreement and written consent of both the employee
and the administration."18 Neither NDSU nor the tenured faculty member
or administrator can unilaterally demand participation in the program;
instead, both parties must mutually agree and consent to participation. 19
After a determination is made that an individual is eligible to par-
ticipate in the program, NDSU determines whether or not it would be in its
best interest to enter into such an agreement with that particular indi-
vidual.20 Generally, a dean, vice-president, or department chair will nego-
tiate the agreement between NDSU and the retiring employee. 21 As part of
the early retirement agreement, employees agree to give up their tenure
rights and/or other contract rights, agree not to seek employment with any
other North Dakota public university or college, and further agree to waive
any claim they may have under the Age Discrimination in Employment
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1045-46.
15. Id. at 1050-52.
16. Id. at 1045.
17. N.D. STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. POLICY MANUAL § 703.1 Early Retirement; N.D.
STATE UNIV. POLICY MANUAL § 360. North Dakota Board of Higher Education Policy § 703.1
provides that the early retirement program is for the mutual benefit of the employee and the
institution. N.D. STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. POLICY MANUAL § 703. l(2)(a).
18. N.D. STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. POLICY MANUAL § 703.1 (2)(b).
19. Id.; see also N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 601 (8th Cir. 2001). To
participate in the program, the sum of the employee's age and total years of employment must
equal or exceed 70. N.D. STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. POLICY MANUAL § 703.1(3)(b)(II); N.D.
State Univ., 255 F.3d at 601. From January 1, 1993 through June 30, 1997, the North Dakota
Board of Higher Education lowered the eligibility requirement to 65 years. N.D. State Univ., 84
F. Supp. 2d at 1045 n.3; N.D. STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. POLICY MANUAL § 703.l(3)(b)(V).
The North Dakota Board of Higher Education Policy Manual noted that the reduction from 70
years to 65 years was a "one time option to assist the institutions and Board in meeting anticipated
staffing reductions due to shortages in appropriations." N.D. STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC.
POLICY MANUAL § 703. l(3)(b)(V).
20. N.D. STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. POLICY MANUAL § 703.1 (3)(b)(V).
21. Id.
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Act.22 All tenured faculty members and administrators typically have con-
tracts with NDSU.23 The rights of an employee under those contracts are
outlined in North Dakota Board of Higher Education (NDBHE) and NDSU
policies regarding dismissal of tenured academic staff or dismissal of non-
classified non-academic staff (administrators).
24
While it is possible for the prospective retiree to receive a payment
equal to 100% of his or her final year's salary, he or she is not entitled to a
100% payment, and amounts received have varied.25 Many factors are con-
sidered in determining the retirement payment amount. 26 While past perfor-
mance, current salary, the curriculum needs of NDSU and the available
budget are considered in determining the amount of the payment, those
factors are not the only considerations and there are no restrictions on the
factors that a negotiating officer may consider.
27
Absent an agreement to voluntarily relinquish tenure, a tenured faculty
member may be dismissed only based upon demonstratively bona fide fi-
nancial exigency, loss of legislative appropriations, loss of institutional or
program enrollment, consolidation of academic units or program areas, or
elimination of courses. 28 A tenured faculty member may also be dismissed
for adequate cause.29 Adequate cause means demonstrated incompetence or
dishonesty, continued unsatisfactory performance and failure to respond to
a recommended plan for improvement, substantial manifest neglect of duty,
conduct substantially impairing the individual's ability to fulfill his or her
responsibilities, physical or mental inability to perform duties, or significant
22. N.D. State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1045-46. The North Dakota State Board of Higher
Education Policy Manual provides that by agreeing to the early retirement, the employee waives
all tenure rights and the employee is further precluded from employment with other institutions
within the North Dakota higher education system. N.D. STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. POLICY
MANUAL § 703.l(3)(a)(I) & (b)(I).
23. N.D. STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. POLICY MANUAL § 703.1(3)(a)(I) & (b)(I).
24. Id.
25. N.D. State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1045; N.D. STATE BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. POLICY
MANUAL § 703. l(3)(b)(II).
26. N.D. State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
27. Id. at 1046.
28. Id. Generally, "No protected property interest is implicated when an employer reassigns,
or transfers an employee absent a specific statutory provision or contract term to the contrary."
Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hosp.,
58 F.3d 533, 539 (10th Cir. 1995)). Absent a specific statutory provision or contract term, tenured
university professors may be moved from one department to another without disturbing a
protected property interest. Hulen, 322 F.3d at 1240. See also Huang v. Bd. of Governors of the
Univ. of N.C., 902 F.2d 1134, 1142 (4th Cir. 1990); Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1551 (1lth
Cir. 1988).
29. Morris v. Clifford, 903 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1990). The regulations on governing
higher educational institutions in North Dakota on academic tenure and due process are contained
in the Faculty Handbook provided to tenured faculty members. Id.
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and continued violations of Board and University policies.30 Tenured fac-
ulty members are also entitled to due process rights, such as a notice and
hearing before the standing committee on faculty rights before dismissal. 31
Initially, NDSU withheld and paid FICA taxes on tenure buyout
payments. 32 Several of the buyout participants questioned NDSU's duty to
withhold FICA taxes during 1991.33 NDSU's payroll director sought gui-
dance from the Social Security Administration (SSA) on the requirement to
withhold.34 The SSA responded to NDSU's inquiry regarding the with-
holding obligation on tenure buyout payments by noting that the "payment
to secure the release on the unexpired contract of employment" is not
considered wages by the SSA for determining the amount of benefits or for
deduction of benefit purposes. 35 After receiving the response from the SSA
that the SSA did not consider the payments to be wages, NDSU stopped
withholding and paying FICA taxes on the tenure buyout payments. 36
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1995 the IRS conducted an audit of NDSU.37 Following the audit
the IRS asserted that NDSU had underpaid its FICA tax liability for all four
quarters for the years 1991 through 1994 with respect to the tenure buyout
payments. 38 NDSU paid the assessed deficiency and once again initiated
withholding of FICA taxes on the tenure buyout payments. 39 After paying
the deficiency, NDSU filed for a refund of the FICA taxes for the 1991
through 1997 tax periods. 40
Section 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code provides the basic
framework for the refund of an overpayment of tax.41 In this instance,
30. N.D. State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1045; see also Morris, 903 F.2d at 576.
31. N.D. State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
32. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 602 (8th Cir. 2001). NDSU has had an
on again off again" policy with regard to withholding FICA tax on tenure buyouts. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
33. N.D. State Univ., 255 F.3d at 602.
34. Id. NDSU's payroll director and general counsel also consulted privately published tax
law treatises and attempted to initiate contact with the Internal Revenue Service. Id.
35. Id. NDSU framed the question as whether its "'tenure buy-out program,' under which
an employee is offered a sum of money to sell their tenure back to the university,' is considered






41. I.R.C. § 6511 (2004). Section 651 l(b)(l) provides that "no credit or refund shall be
allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitations prescribed ... for the filing of a
claim for credit or refund, unless a claim for credit or refund is filed by the taxpayer within such
2004]
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NDSU timely paid the additional assessments and subsequently filed claims
for refund with the IRS.42 Because the Secretary of the Treasury failed to
respond to the claims for refund within six months of the date that they
were filed, the claims for refund were deemed to have been administratively
denied and NDSU was allowed to initiate an action to secure a refund in the
Federal District Court for the District of North Dakota.
4 3
After initiation of the litigation, the Government filed a motion for
summary judgment asserting that payments made to terminate an em-
ployee's tenure were wages subject to FICA taxation.44 On September 7,
1999 NDSU timely filed a response to the Government's motion for
summary judgment seeking summary judgment in its favor. 45 NDSU ar-
gued that the payments compensated the employees for the termination of a
valuable property interest, their tenure, and therefore were not wages sub-
ject to FICA Taxation.46 NDSU further asserted that in the event the dis-
trict court determined that the payments were subject to FICA taxation
NDSU was entitled to relief pursuant to the "deputy tax collector" doctrine
because it did not have clear and precise notice of its requirement to
withhold FICA taxes. 4 7
period." Id. § 6511 (b)(1). A claim for refund is timely if the claim is filed within three years from
the date the return was filed or within two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later.
Id. § 651 l(b)(2).
42. Id. § 6511(a). Claims for refund of employment taxes are made on Form 843.
Completion of Form 843 requires identification information for the taxpayer, the tax periods
involved, the amount to be refunded or abated, identification of the type of tax, identification of
the type of return that was filed, identification of the dates of payment, and an explanation as to
why the taxpayer believes the claim should be allowed. Care should be taken in drafting a claim
for refund because a subsequent refund suit is required to be based on the same grounds as stated
in the claim for refund. See, e.g., Iowa 80 Group, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 203 F.
Supp. 2d 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (noting the Internal Revenue Service is not required to "ferret
out" the claims that are being asserted by the taxpayer). The requirement to state the basis for the
claim is intended to provide the Internal Revenue Service with an opportunity to investigate the
grounds the taxpayer asserts entitle the taxpayer to a refund at the administrative level. I.R.C. §
7422(a) (2002); 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (2002). A claim for refund is required to set forth
in detail each ground upon which the taxpayer asserts a credit or refund is due and in a manner
that asserts sufficient facts to appraise the Commissioner of the exact basis for the refund claim.
26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-2(b)(1).
43. I.R.C. § 6532(a) (2002). A refund suit may be initiated any time within two years after
the date the IRS has disallowed the claim. Id. A claim for refund is deemed to have been denied
if no action is taken by the Secretary within six months after the filing of the claim. Id. The
United States district courts and the Court of Federal Claims have jurisdiction over suits to recover
to IRS taxes that are alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed and/or collected. 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2002).
44. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1044 (D.N.D. 1999).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1050.
47. Id. at 1053.
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On November 19, 1999, the district court, the Honorable Rodney S.
Webb presiding, issued its Memorandum Decision and Order.4 8 The dis-
trict court concluded that tenure establishes a constitutionally protected
property interest in continued employment.49 The district court thereafter
concluded that tenure was akin to a contract right and, "[c]onsequently, a
payment for relinquishing tenure rights is a payment for the purchase of a
property interest."50 "As a purchase of a property interest, the payment is
not a 'wage' or 'remuneration for services' and thus not subject to FICA
taxation." 51 Based upon these determinations the district court concluded
that NDSU was not required to withhold FICA taxes or payments made for
the purpose of terminating an employee's tenure.52
Several other individuals who received payments under the early
retirement program were administrators. 53 The district court concluded that
those individuals were employees at-will and did not have a property in-
terest in their position.S4 Based upon this determination, the district court
concluded "the payments made to tenured administrators [under the early
retirement program] are wages for FICA withholding purposes." 55
III. FICA TAX STRUCTURE
The structure for imposing FICA tax is codified in §§ 3101 through
3128 of Chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code.56 The FICA tax is im-
posed upon wages5 7 and is deducted by the employer from each payment of
wages made to an employee. 58 Every employer that provides a payment of
wages to employees is required to deduct and withhold from the employees'
wages FICA taxes.59 Included within the FICA tax are the old age, survivor
and disability insurance (OASDI), and hospital insurance (HI).60 The FICA
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1051.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1052.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1048.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. I.R.C. § 3101, et seq. (2002).
57. Id. § 3121(a).
58. Id. § 3102(a).
59. Id. § 3402(a)(1).
60. Id. §§ 3101, 3111. The burden imposed by employment taxes has steadily increased
throughout its history. See id. § 3101 (setting forth the history of the employment tax rate
imposed on employees); see also id. § 3111 (setting forth the history of the employment tax rate
imposed on employers). In 1937, the combined OASDI and HI taxes imposed on an employee
were equal to 1% of the taxable wage base and have increased to their current combined level of
7.65%. See id. § 3101 (setting forth the history of the self-employment tax rate imposed on
2004]
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tax withheld from wage payments to employees is subject to a matching
FICA tax on the employer. 61
Inherent in determining the applicability of the FICA tax is deter-
mination of an employee/employer relationship 62 and the determination of
whether the payments constitute wages. 63 NDSU conceded the em-
ployer/employee relationship but challenged the Internal Revenue Service's
determination that the tenure buyout payments constituted wages.64
The definition of "wages" has remained relatively unchanged since the
original definition appeared in 1935.65 Wages are defined for purposes of
the Internal Revenue Code as "all remuneration from employment." 66
While Section 3121 provides a number of specific exceptions to the
definition of wages, 67 the scope of FICA taxation has been broadly
construed.68
employees). The combined rate (employer and employee obligations) now imposed upon
employees and employers is 15.3% of the taxable wage base. Id. §§ 3101, 3111.
61. Id. § 3111.
62. Id. § 3121(d) (defining the term "employee" for purposes of FICA taxation). The
common law factors are applied in determining whether an employer-employee relationship
exists. Treas. Regs. § § 31.3401(c)-I (B), 31-3121(d)-I (C)(2), 31.3306(i)-I (b) (2004). Although
the common law test for determining employee or independent contractor status has been
expressed in a variety of formulations, the underlying issue is whether or not there is control over
the individual providing services. It should also be noted that the FICA tax regulations speci-
fically referred to the right to discharge, the employer providing tools and the employer providing
a place to work as factors indicating an employer-employee relationship. Treas. Reg. §§
31.3401(c)-1(B), 31.3401(d)-1, 31.3121(d)-1(C), 31.3306(i)-I. Common law factors have been
described in various revenue rulings issued by the Internal Revenue Service. See, e.g., Rev. Rul.
87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. Similarly, courts have outlined a variety of factors to determine the
employer-employee relationship. See, e.g., LEB's Enter., Inc. v. United States, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 00-
886 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (setting forth factors or elements to determine if sufficient control is present
to establish employee-employer relationship); Vizcaino v. United States Dist. Ct. W.D. of Wash.,
173 F.3d 713, 723 (9th Cir. 1999) (outlining factors to determine the employer-employee
relationship). Compensation in excess of the social security and unemployment wage base,
accident and disability payments, moving expenses, fringe benefits, dependent care assistance,
group legal services, group term life insurance, employer reimbursements, death benefits, combat
zone compensation, non-cash remuneration and de minimis amounts are not subject to
withholding requirements. I.R.C. § 312 1(a) (2002).
63. Id. Generally, all compensation derived from employment, unless otherwise excluded, is
considered wages. Id.
64. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1048 (D.N.D. 1999). The district
court framed the question as follows: "determining whether the early retirement payments made to
administrators and tenured faculty members were wages for purposes of FICA taxation." Id.
65. The Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 210, 49 Stat. 620, 625 (1935).
66. I.R.C. § 3121(a).
67. Id. Deferred compensation benefits are excluded from the definition of wages for the
purposes of the FICA tax. Id. § 3121(a)(5). Accident and disability payments are generally
subject to FICA tax but will not be subject to FICA tax if paid pursuant to a workman's
compensation statute, attributable to a benefit resulting from the employee's payment of the
accident or disability premiums, or the benefits are paid after the expiration of six calendar months
following the employee's employment. Id. § 3121(a), (a)(2), (a)(4). Moving expenses are
generally excluded from FICA taxation. Id. § 3121(a)( 1I). Fringe benefits that are excluded from
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Section 3121 defines wages as follows: "the term 'wages' means all
remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all remuneration
(including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash .... "69 The em-
ployer's designation placed on the payment such as "salary," "fees,"
"bonuses," "commissions," or other identification is not relevant for
determining whether the payment is considered wages.70 Additionally, the
median and/or manner in which the employer pays the compensation is not
relevant to determining whether the FICA tax applies. 71 Compensation in
an employee's taxable income are excluded from FICA taxation. Id. § 3121(a)(20). Dependent
care assistance is excludable from FICA taxation if the payment is excludable from the
employee's taxable income. Id. § 3121(a)(18). Employer paid group term life insurance is not
subject to FICA taxation. Id. § 3121(a)(2). The reimbursement of ordinary and necessary ex-
penses by the employer to an employee is not subject to FICA taxes. Treas. Reg. 31.3121(a)-I (h)
(2004). Death benefits paid by an employer on behalf of an employee or the employee's de-
pendants are exempt from FICA taxation. I.R.C. § 3121(a)(2), (13).
68. Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946). The United States Supreme Court noted
that the term "wages" was to be broadly interpreted and extends even to non-productive activity.
Id. at 365-66. The broad judicial interpretation of the term "wages" is consistent with
congressional intent to protect beneficiaries of the FICA tax structure by ensuring that an
expansive range of remuneration is captured within the FICA tax structure. United States v. Silk,
331 U.S. 704, 714 (1947); Halvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937). Congress expressed its
intent to broadly define employer-furnished remuneration in order to further advance the remedial
purposes of the Social Security Act. H.R. REP. No. 74-615, 1st Sess. 3 (1935), reprinted in 1939-
2 C.B. 600, 601; Halvering, 301 U.S. at 641; Silk, 331 U.S. at 712. The United States Supreme
Court in Silk noted that a restrictive interpretation of the terms used within the Social Security Act
"would only make for a continuance, to a considerable degree, of the difficulties for which [social
security] was devised and would invite adroit schemes by some employers and employees to
avoid the immediate burden at the expense of the benefit sought by the legislature." Silk, 331 U.S.
at 712. The legislative history for the Social Security Act amendments of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-21,
97 Stat. 65 further confirms the broad scope with which the term "wages" is intended to apply by
noting the following:
The Social Security program aims to replace the income of beneficiaries when that
income is reduced on account of retirement and disability. Thus, the amount of
'wages' is the measure used both to define income which should be replaced and to
compute FICA tax liability. Since the security system has objectives which are
significantly different from the objective underlying the income tax withholding rules,
the committee believes that the amounts exempt from income tax withholding should
not be exempt from RCA unless Congress provides an explicit RCA tax exclusion.
S. REP. No. 98-23, at 42, reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 183; H.R. REP. No. 98-25, Pt. I at
80, reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 219, 299.
69. I.R.C. § 3121(a).
70. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-(c) (2004). All "compensation for employment" is subject to
the withholding requirements of FICA and FUTA, regardless of what the compensation is called.
Lane Processing Trust v. United States, 25 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing 26 CFR §
31.3121(a)-1(C) (2004)). "Regardless of the name given to the payment, a payment constitutes
'wages' when given as remuneration for employment." Greenwald v. United States, 85
A.F.T.R.2d 00-766 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
71. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-(e). In determining whether or not remuneration to an
employee constitutes wages, it is generally immaterial how payment is made. STA of Baltimore-
ILA Container Royal Fund v. United States, 621 F. Supp. 1567, 1575 (D. Md. 1985).
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excess of the social security and unemployment wage base is exempt from
the FICA tax. 72
IV. TENURE RIGHTS ARE A PROPERTY INTEREST WHICH FALLS
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE AND DEFINITION OF THE TERM
"WAGES"
A. TENURE IS A PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST
Despite the intent to broadly construe the term "wages" for purposes of
FICA taxation, NDSU asserted that the purchase of tenure is not the
payment of "wages" and is instead the purchase of a property interest,
which is not subject to the duty to withhold FICA taxes. 73 In Morris v.
Clifford,74 the Eighth Circuit had previously acknowledged that a tenured
faculty member can be dismissed only for adequate cause and that a tenured
faculty member has a constitutionally protected property interest in
continued employment. 75 The Morris decision, which cites several Eighth
Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court decisions, recognized that a tenured faculty
member has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued
employment.76 In addition to procedural due process rights, a tenured
faculty member also has substantive due process rights "to be free from
discharge for reasons that are 'arbitrary and capricious,' or in other words,
for reasons that are trivial, unrelated to the education process, or wholly
unsupported by basis in fact."77 Given the substantial procedural and
substantive due process rights, a tenured faculty member can only be
terminated for "adequate cause." 78 In Morris, a University of North Dakota
72. I.R.C. § 3121(a)(1).
73. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D.N.D. 1999), aff'd, 255 F.3d
599 (8th Cir. 2001).
74. 903 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1990).
75. Morris, 903 F.2d at 576.
76. Id. at 576 (citing Moore v. Warwick Pub. Sch. Dist., 794 F.2d 322, 328-30 (8th Cir.
1986); Agarwal v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 504, 507-08 n.2 (8th Cir. 1986);
Stermetz v. Harper, 763 F.2d 366, 367 (8th Cir. 1985); O'Neal v. City of Hot Springs Nat'l Park,
756 F.2d 61, 62-63 (8th Cir. 1985); Miller v. Dean, 552 F.2d 266, 268 (8th Cir. 1977); Fisher v.
Snyder, 476 F.2d 375, 376-77 (8th Cir. 1977)); see generally, Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin,
440 U.S. 194, 197 (1979).
77. Morris, 903 F.2d at 577 (citing Fisher, 476 F.2d at 377-78; Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d
565, 568-69 (5th Cir. 1987); Garquil v. Thompkins, 704 F.2d 661, 667-69 (2d Cir. 1983), vacated
on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1016 (1984)).
78. Id.
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faculty member was determined to have a protective property interest, and
"adequate cause" existed to terminate the employee. 79
Decisions establishing tenure as a protective property interest are not
limited to North Dakota institutions. 80 For example, in Agarwal v. Regents
of University of Minnesota,8' the Eighth Circuit Court recognized that a
tenured faculty member has a protected property interest in continued
employment.82 In Agarwal, the Eighth Circuit Court recognized that the
protected property interest prevents dismissal of a tenured faculty member
without due process.
83
State law establishes the existence of a property interest.84 While state
law establishes the property interest, federal constitutional law determines
whether a particular state law property interest rises to the level of a consti-
tutionally protected property interest. 85 In order to prevail on a claim that a
person's substantive due process has been unconstitutionally denied, the
claimant must first establish that they had a property or liberty interest at
stake.86
Although the existence of a property interest in continued employment
has been recognized by many courts, because the NDSU decision arises in
North Dakota, it is helpful to briefly discuss property interests in the
79. Id. at 576-77. See also Thompson v. Peterson, 546 N.W.2d 856, 863 (N.D. 1996) (citing
Morris v. Clifford for the proposition that a tenured faculty member cannot be dismissed unless
there is adequate cause and holding that a tenured faculty member has a protected property
interest).
80. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972). In
Roth, the United States Supreme Court summarized its decisions upholding the procedural due
process safeguards applicable to tenured faculty members. Id. at 576-77 (citing Slochower v. Bd.
of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)). See also Moore, 794
F.2d at 328-30; Stermetz, 763 F.2d at 367; O'Neal, 756 F.2d at 62-63; Miller, 552 F.2d at 268;
Fisher, 476 F.2d at 376-77.
81. 788 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1986).
82. Agarwal, 788 F.2d at 507 n.2. Public employees who can only be discharged for cause
have constitutionally protected property interest and their tenure cannot be terminated without due
process. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578; Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997).
83. Agarwal, 788 F.2d at 507 n.2. (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77).
84. See, e.g., Riley v. St. Louis County of Mo., 153 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1998); Eddings v.
City of Hot Springs, Ark., 323 F.3d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 344-45 (1976)).
85. Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995).
86. United States v. Wilson, 316 F.3d 506, 510 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Smith v. Ashcroft, 295
F.3d 425, 429 (4th Cir. 2002)). States and other political subdivisions are prohibited by the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution from "deprive[ing] any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Jocham v. Tuscola County,
239 F. Supp. 2d 714, 726 (E.D. Mich. 2003). A claimant is not entitled to substantive due process
under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution unless the claimant has a cognizable
life, liberty, or property interest at stake. Ashki v. I.N.S., 233 F.3d 913, 921 (6th Cir. 2000). The
United States Constitution does not create an abstract federal due process right for the sake of due
process itself. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2000).
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employment context in North Dakota.87 In Hennum v. City of Medina,88
relying upon United States Supreme Court case law, the North Dakota
Supreme Court recognized a distinction between at-will employees and
employees with a protected property interest.89 The North Dakota Supreme
Court recognized that property interests are not created by the Constitution
but are instead created and defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source.90
In Rudnick v. City of Jamestown91 , the North Dakota Supreme Court
recognized that employees with protected property interests are entitled to
other protections not afforded to an employee at-will. 92 In Livingood v.
Meece,93 the North Dakota Supreme Court again held that a property
interest could be created in continued employment. 94 The North Dakota
Supreme Court recognized that property interests could be created by
statutes, regulations, ordinances, or implied contracts. 95 Personnel policies
contained in employee handbooks or manuals can also create a property
interest in continued employment. 96 In Livingood, the North Dakota
Supreme Court noted that the North Dakota Personnel Policy Manual could
potentially be the basis of a constitutionally protected property interest. 97
87. To establish a due process violation in the context of public employment, the claimant is
first required to show a cognizable property interest in continued employment. See Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, (1985); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976). A
number of states have recognized a protected property interest in employment contracts and/or
tenure. See, e.g., Bluitt v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 236 F. Supp. 2d 703, 731 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(both parties agreed claimant employed under an HISD contract had a protected property interest
in employment); Sharp v. Lindsey, 285 F.3d 479, 487 (6th Cir. 2002) (recognizing a protected
property interest created by Tennessee's Teacher Tenure Act); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-501(10)
(2003)); Mills v. Steger, 179 F. Supp. 2d 637, 644 (W.D. Va. 2002) (manager of public radio
station owned by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University had a protective property
interest); Spagnola v. State Bd. of Agric., 13 Fed. Appx. 870, 872 (10th Cir. 2001) (tenured
professional in Colorado had a protected property interest); Trimble v. W. Va. Bd. of Dir., 549
S.E.2d 294, 301 (W. Va. 2001) (recognizing a constitutionally protected property interest in
tenured teaching positions); State Tenure Comm'n v. Page, 777 So.2d 126, 131 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000) (acknowledging four requirements necessary to afford minimal due process to a teacher);
Panzella v. River Trails Sch. Dist. 26, 729 N.E.2d 954, 958-59 (I11. App. Ct. 2000)
(acknowledging that the School Code provides that a tenured teacher may only be discharged for
cause); Wuest v. Whinner School Dist. 59-2, 607 N.W.2d 912, 918 (S.D. 2000) (state law
provides a tenured teacher with a protected property interest).
88. 402 N.W.2d 327 (N.D. 1987).
89. Hennum, 402 N.W.2d at 335 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 578).
90. Id. (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 578).
91. 463 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1990).
92. Rudnick, 463 N.W.2d at 638.
93. 477 N.W.2d 183 (N.D. 1991).
94. Livingood, 477 N.W.2d at 192.
95. Id. at 193 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976)).
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Little v. Spaeth, 394 N.W.2d 700, 704 (N.D. 1986)).
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B. THE PURCHASE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT IS NOT REMUNERATION
FOR SERVICES
Tenure is a property interest, which entitles a tenured faculty member
to continued employment. 98 A tenure buy-out is therefore arguably a
purchase of a property right and is not remuneration for services. 99 While
the payment to the tenured faculty member is undoubtedly income, it does
not constitute wages for purposes of employment taxation.100 Two revenue
rulings, a number of private letter rulings, and several court opinions have
been issued on the subject of whether the purchase of an individual's
property interest in continued employment is considered wages.101
In Revenue Ruling 58-301, the taxpayer had an employment contract
for a period of five years.102 In the second year of the employment, the tax-
payer and the employer agreed to cancel the remaining period of the
contract.103 In consideration for the cancellation of the contract, the em-
ployer provided payment to the employee. 04 The IRS ruled that the pay-
ment constituted income to the employee but was not wages for federal
employment and income tax withholding purposes.105 Revenue Ruling 58-
98. Morris v. Clifford, 903 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1990). See also Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 565, 573-75 (1972). Property interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Id. at
577. The constitutionally protected property interests are derived from statutes, ordinances,
contracts, implied contracts, and other rules that may be developed by state officials. Id. at 577-
78; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Perry v. Sinderman, 408
U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972).
99. See supra notes 73-97 and accompanying text.
100. See Spiegelman v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 394, 403 (1994) (stating not all amounts of
employment income under the general definition of wages provided in I.R.C. § 61 are wages)
(citing Cent. 11. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 25 (1978)).
101. Rev. Rul. 58-301, 1958-2 C.B. 23 (2004); Milligan v. Comm'r, 38 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.
1994); Gump v. United States, 86 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
102. In Revenue Ruling 58-301, 1958-1 C.B. 23, the Internal Revenue Service was requested
to determine "whether an amount received by an employee as consideration for the cancellation of
an employment contract constitutes ordinary income or capital gain, and, in either event, the
taxable year of its inclusion gross income." Rev. Rul. 58-301, 1958-1 C.B. 23. The Internal
Revenue Service answers inquiries from individuals and organizations "whenever appropriate in
the interest of sound tax administration" to provide guidance regarding the tax effects of particular
transactions and/or to provide guidance regarding a taxpayer's status for tax purposes. 26 C.F.R.
§ 601.201(a) (2004). The Internal Revenue Service provides official interpretations and appli-
cation of tax laws to specific facts and circumstances through Revenue Rulings. Id. §
601.201(a)(6). While Revenue Rulings provide guidance on substantive tax matters, they do not
have the force and effect of a regulation because no notice or opportunity has been given to the
public. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(d) (2004).
103. Rev. Rul. 58-301, 1958-1 C.B. 23.
104. Id.
105. Id. Specifically, Revenue Ruling 58-301 provides the following:
Accordingly, it is held that a lump sum payment received by an employee as
consideration for the cancellation of his employment contract constitutes gross income
to the recipient in the taxable year of receipt. However, such amount is not subject to
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301 relied upon McFall v. Commissioner, 10 6 which held that such a contract
constituted a property right.107 Accordingly, the Service ruled that while a
contract right was not a capital asset, it nevertheless did not constitute
wages for purposes of income or FICA withholding.108
A 1994 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also provides
guidance on whether or not the purchase of an employment contract
constitutes wages for purposes of income of FICA withholding.109 Milligan
was an insurance agent working for State Farm Insurance Company.10
Milligan had entered into a number of employment contracts, the last of
which provided for certain termination payments in the event that he
separated from service."'l To qualify for termination payments, it was nec-
essary for Milligan to have worked for at least two years with State Farm,
sold policies, and agreed not to compete with State Farm following his
termination. 1 2 The amount of his termination payments was determined by
Federal employment and income tax withholding provisions of Section 3121 of the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act in Section 3402 of the Code, (Chapters 21 and
24, respectively, Subtitle C, Internal Revenue Code of 1954). See Rev. Rul. 55-520
C.B. 1955-2, 393.
Id.
106. 34 B.T.A. 108 (1936).
107. McFall, 34 B.T.A. at 110-11. The McFall decision involved the determination of
whether the sale and assignment of an employment contract to a third person resulted in capital
gain. Id. In McFall, the United States Board of Tax Appeals held that the sale of an employment
contract to a third person did not result in a capital gain. Id. In McFall, the United States Board
of Tax Appeals stated the following:
[T]here was a right of petitioners to continue to perform service and then to be paid-to
persist in their contractual relation for its agreed term. While this right is property in
the constitutional sense, in that it could not be arbitrarily legislated away, it is not
capital .... Obviously it is not the sort of property which is susceptible of ownership
for a length of time as is a share of stock, a bond, or a thing.
Id.
The United States Board of Tax Appeals also reached a similar conclusion in George K.
Gann v. Commissioner. 41 BTA 388 (1940). In Gann, the United States Board of Tax Appeals
held that payment from an employer to an employee for the cancellation of a contract of
employment was ordinary income and not capital gain. Id. However, Revenue Ruling 58-301
noted that the Gann decision was premised upon the distinction that the employee had special
qualifications and skills that were a material and greeting of the contract and therefore the contract
could not be sold. Rev. Rul. 58-301, 1958-2 C.B. 23.
108. Rev. Rul. 58-301, 1958-2 C.B. 23.
109. See Milligan v. Comm'r, 38 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing the underlying Tax
Court decision, Milligan v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1282 (1992)). The IRS subsequently
issued a notice of nonacquiescence to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Milligan. Milligan v.
Comm'r, 1996-1 I.R.B. 5. The Tax Court, subsequent to the Ninth Circuit opinion, expressly
overruled its earlier decision in Milligan after concluding that the Ninth Circuit's decision and
rationale were persuasive. Jackson v. Comm'r, 108 T.C. 130, 137 (1997).
110. Milligan, 38 F.3d at 1095.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1095-97.
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a fraction of the amount of his prior compensation.l"3 Milligan's contract
of employment provided for a right to be bought out, a factor which is not
present with respect to the tenured university faculty members and certainly
provides greater weight for the position that tenure purchases are not wages;
a tenured faculty member might be bought out of tenure by the university
but the faculty member has no right to be bought out. 114
While the Tax Court felt that the payments were subject to self-
employment tax, the Ninth Circuit reversed."t 5 The Ninth Circuit held, "to
be taxable as self-employment income, earnings must be tied to the quantity
or quality of the taxpayer's prior labor, rather than the mere fact that the
taxpayer worked or works for the payer.""16
In Milligan, the Government argued that Milligan's previous status of
working for State Farm provided the only necessary link for subjecting the
payments to withholding taxes. 1l7 The Ninth Circuit responded by holding:
Without more, this link between the disputed payments and any
business activity carried on by Milligan does not satisfy the
"derive" requirement. It is not enough that, had the taxpayer not
performed certain services (that were fully compensated for)-not
been an independent contractor, for example-the taxpayer never
would have received the disputed payments. See Newberry [v.
Commissioner,] 76 T.C. [441,] 445 [1981] (harmonizing self-
employment tax with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act: [Footnote 7 omitted] An
individual who becomes eligible for benefits as a 'result of the
individual's employ[ment] status at some previous time' has not
received wages subject to social security tax. "[In no way are the
benefits a function of the employee's providing services for his
113. Id. at 1096.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1095. See Milligan v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1282, 17 (1992) (focusing on
the fact that the termination payments made to Milligan, although not based upon renewal
commissions, were based upon the policies enforced in the last year of the agency). The Tax
Court therefore concluded that the termination payments were the equivalent of deferred
compensation received by the agent for policies sold in prior years. Id. After concluding that the
termination payments were the equivalent of deferred compensation, the Tax Court held that the
payments were "derived from self-employment, even though they are received in years subsequent
to the activity which generated them. Consequently, we hold that [t]ermination [playments
constitute income from self-employment and are subject to self-employment tax." Id. at 19.
116. Milligan v. Comm'r, 38 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1994). Self-employment income is
(1) derived (2) from a trade or business (3) carried on by an individual. Id. at 1097.
117. Id. at 1098. The dispute in Milligan was whether the income was "derived" from
Milligan's trade or business. Id. The Ninth Circuit focused on the term "derived" and the
required nexus between the income and the trade or business. Id.
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employer. Those benefits are not derived from any employment
carried on. ").
Because Milligan had been fully compensated for his services
none of his business activity was the "source" of the Termination
Payments. The payments did not represent deferred compensation
of previously-earned commissions .... 118
The Ninth Circuit held that the payments were not derived from
Milligan's prior service for which he had been fully compensated."1
9
Therefore, the payments could not be "wages" subject to the duty to
withhold. 120
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has also
decided a case involving the purchase of future employment. 121 Like Mil-
ligan, Gump was an insurance agent who received payment pursuant a
business cancellation agreement.122 The Federal Circuit recognized that
Gump's payment did not derive from withheld portions of his prior
salary.123 The Federal Circuit recognized that Gump had no vested right to
receive payments and the payments were conditional upon two contractual
requirements.124 While the payments were computed by reference to prior
earnings, the reference was a reasonable indicator of the value of the right
being relinquished by Gump.125
The Federal Circuit placed no significance on the fact that the
calculation of the payment for termination of Gump's property right was
tied to Gump's past earnings.126 The Federal Circuit noted the following:
[T]he renewal commissions generated in Gump's last year deter-
mined the amount of the extended earnings payment, subject to
adjustment, not the right to it. The only significance that can pro-
perly be attached to this amount is that it was used as a benchmark
to determine how much he would receive if he complied with the
agreement. 127
118. Id. at 1098-99 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 1099.
120. Id.
121. Gump v. United States, 86 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
122. Id. at 1127.
123. Id. at 1128.
124. Id. at 1129.
125. Id. at 1129-30. The prior year's earnings were only a "benchmark" for calculation and
Gump was not entitled to the prior year's earnings. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1129.
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As with the Gump and Milligan decisions, the tenured faculty members
at NDSU received a payment based upon a percentage of their prior
salary. 128 The percentage of the prior salary is used only for convenience as
a way of valuing the property interest that is being terminated.129 Payments
ranged from 100% to 25% of the faculty member's last year's salary.130
Tenure possesses unique and intangible qualities. 31 As noted by the
United States District Court for the District of North Dakota with regard to
defining tenure:
Tenure is an ethereal concept; although commonly understood,
tenure escapes precise definition. To add to its abstract nature,
tenure only truly exists in a small, albeit important niche of the
world, namely on college and university campuses. Yet in this
niche, tenure is an extremely valuable achievement.132 The value
of tenure as a property interest cannot be disputed.133
It is clear that the unique nature of tenure has less to do with the quality
or quantity of the faculty member's labor, but instead exists for the purpose
of ensuring academic freedom that is fundamental to the advancement of
128. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1045 (D.N.D. 1999).
129. Id. at 1045. It is possible for a retiring faculty member to receive a payment equal to
100% of his or her final year's salary. Id. A number of factors, including past performance, cur-
rent salary, curriculum needs of the university, and the available budget are all considered in
determining the amount to be paid to purchase the tenure rights. Id.
130. Id. at n.4.
131. Id. at 1050.
132. Id. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota also noted that the
policy manuals for NDSU and the North Dakota Board of Higher Education noted the following
regarding tenure: "A college or university is a forum for ideas, and it cannot fulfill its purpose of
transmitting, evaluating, and extending knowledge if it requires conformity with any orthodoxy of
content and method. Academic freedom and tenure are both important in guaranteeing the
existence of such a forum." N.D. STATE UNIV. POLICY MANUAL § 350.1 (1); N.D. STATE BD. OF
HIGHER EDUC. POLICY MANUAL § 605.1(1)(a). In noting that academic freedom applies to all
scholarly pursuits and is fundamental to the achievement of knowledge, the United States District
Court for the District of North Dakota quoted the following from the United States Supreme
Court:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-
evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any straight jacket upon the intel-
lectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.
No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries
cannot be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, prin-
ciples are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of sus-
picion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to stu-
dy and evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
would stagnate and die.
N.D. State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1050 (quoting Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957)).
133. Id. at 1051.
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knowledge.134 It is this unique nature that makes the purchase of a tenure
property interest fall outside the scope of providing compensation for the
prior work of the faculty member.
C. CONCLUSION: TENURE IS A PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST,
THE PURCHASE OF WHICH IS NOT THE PAYMENT OF WAGES
Tenured faculty members have a constitutionally protected property
right, which when purchased does not constitute compensation for purposes
of FICA taxation. Both federal and state substantive laws clearly establish
that tenured faculty members have a property interest. Under the reasoning
employed by the Ninth Circuit in the Milligan decision, the payments are
not derived from the tenured faculty member's prior service; service for
which they have been fully compensated. This is consistent with Revenue
Ruling 58-301, 1958-2 C.B. 23 and the Gump decision. This legal founda-
tion compels the conclusion that the purchase of tenure is the purchase of a
property interest, which is not subject to FICA taxation.
V. CASE LAW, WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN SELF-EMPLOYMENT
TAX CASES, PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR THE RESOLUTION
OF WHETHER TENURE FALLS WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF
"WAGES"
A. SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAx is EQUIVALENT TO FICA
The United States Tax Court has previously recognized the close
relationship between the self-employment tax and taxation under the
Federal Insurance Contribution Act. 135 In Spiegelman, the Tax Court stated
the following:
Chapter 21, commonly referred to as the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) (secs. 3101-3128), and chapter 23,
commonly known as the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)
(secs. 3301-3311), impose certain taxes on employers and
employees based on wages paid to employees. For self-employed
individuals, roughly corresponding taxes are imposed on self-
employment income derived from carrying on a trade or business.
Ch. 2 (secs. 1401-1403); see Newberry v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.
134. Id. at 1050.
135. Spiegelman v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 394 (1994). See also Milligan v. Comm'r, 38 F.3d
1094, 1099 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating "the self-employment tax on self-employed individuals is
the counterpart to the tax on employees' wages under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
('FUTA') and the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA)").
[VOL. 80:11
2004] TENURE BUYOUT EMPLOYMENT TAX
441, 443 (1981). In the case of FICA and FUTA taxes, not all
amounts of income under section 61 received from an employer
are includable in the definition of wages. Central Ill. Pub. Serv.
Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 25 (1978). [Footnote 7 omitted]
And, with regard to tax on self-employment income, not all
amounts of income received are derived from carrying on a trade
or business. Newberry v. Commissioner, supra.136
Because of the close relationship between self-employment tax and the
tax imposed on employees pursuant to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
and the Federal Insurance Contribution Act, the cases involving self-
employed individuals with property rights in their relationships are helpful
in determining whether the purchase of a property interest is subject to
FICA taxation. This is particularly true in tenure cases where the Govern-
ment concedes that prior to the NDSU decision, no direct court or
administrative precedent existed for determination of this issue. 137
B. THE DEFINITION OF "WAGES" IS DEFINED MUCH MORE
NARROWLY THAN INCOME IN THE CONTEXT OF
WITHHOLDING TAXES
The duty to withhold FICA taxes is construed very broadly.138 There is
no question that the broad scope of the term "wages" was intended by
136. Spiegelman, 102 T.C. at 403 (emphasis added). Spiegelman held a Bachelor's Degree
of Arts in Geology and Geophysics from Harvard University and a Ph.D. from the University of
Cambridge in England. Id. at 395. Spiegelman was awarded a one-year Lamont Post-Doctoral
Research Fellowship from Columbia University in the amount of $27,500. Id. Despite its label as"non-employee compensation," the Tax Court determined that the fellowship grant was not
subject to self-employment taxation because it was not paid as compensation to Spiegelman for
services. Id. at 406. The Tax Court determined that the fellowship award was not income derived
from a trade or business but was instead a "noncompensatory scholarship and fellowship grant
more from the 'detached and disinterested' munificence of the grantor than from the activities of
the recipient in carrying on a trade or business." Id.
137. But see Slotta v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., No. G-93-92, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21205
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1994) (unpublished decision).
138. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 711 (1947); Halvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641
(1937). The Internal Revenue Code defines "wages" as "all remuneration from employment,"
unless the remuneration falls within one of the statutorily specified exceptions. I.R.C. § 3121(a)
(2004). Similarly, the term "employment" is defined broadly as "any service, of whatever nature,
performed... by an employee for the person employing him." Id. § 3121(b). These broad defi-
nitions have been interpreted to be consistent with the purpose of FICA in "protecting
beneficiaries from some of the hardships of existence" by providing broad definitions that will
capture an expansive range of remuneration. Silk, 331 U.S. at 711. The definitions of "wages"
and "employment" used to impose FICA taxation originated in the Social Security Act of 1935
and have since that time remained relatively unchanged. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No.
74-271, § 210, 49 Stat. 620, 625 (1935). The Congressional intent in developing the FICA
taxation system has been summarized as intended to apply to a broad range of employer-furnished
remuneration in order to accomplish the remedial purposes of the Social Security Act. See H.R.
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Congress to provide that all payments arising out of the employer-employee
relationship would be subject to FICA taxation.1 39 Despite the broad defi-
nition intended for the term "wages," no authority stood for the proposition
that FICA statutes are to be interpreted broadly and involve a factual
situation where a property interest has been terminated. However, sub-
stantial authority exists to establish that the definition of wages is to be
narrowly construed under such circumstances. 140 "Indeed, 'wages,' in the
withholding context, is defined more narrowly than income."14 Even
though a payment may constitute income to an employee it does not neces-
sarily follow that the payment will be deemed "wages" subject to with-
holding provisions. 14
2
In order for there to be a duty to withhold, there must be a relationship
between the payment and the performance of services.143 That relationship
REP. No. 74-615, 1st Sess. 3 (1935), reprinted in 1939-2 C.B. 600, 601 (describing purpose of
Social Security Act); Silk, 331 U.S. at 712; Davis, 301 U.S. at 641.
139. See Lane Processing Trust v. United States, 25 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1994)
(construing the terms "wages" and "employment" broadly in order to accomplish the remedial
purposes of FICA taxation and FUTA taxation). The legislative history for the Social Security
Act Amendments of 1983, Pub.L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 provide further confirmation of the broad
definition to be applied to the term "wages." S. REP. No. 98-23, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. at 42,
reprinted in 1983-2 C.B. 326, 333; H.R. REP. No. 98-25, P.T. 1 at 80, reprinted in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. 219, 299.
140. Gen. Elevator Corp. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 345, 351 (Cl. Ct. 1990) (citing Cent. Ill.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 29 (1978); Hotel Conquistador, Inc. v. United States,
597 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (Ct. Cl. 1979)). In General Elevator, the employees received per diem
payments and other reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses when they traveled to various job
sites. Id. at 352. The Court of Claims was charged with determining whether the per diem
payments to the employees of General Elevator were "wages." Id. The Court of Claims, applying
the definition of wages as used in § 3401(a) and clarified in Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(2)
excluded reimbursements for travel or other bona fide ordinary necessary expenses paid by an
employee but reasonably expected to be incurred in the business of the employer. Id.
141. Id. at 351. As noted by the United States Claims Court, "even though certain payments
of expenses to an employee may constitute income to the employee, it does not necessarily follow
that they will be deemed 'wages' subject to the withholding provision." Id.; see also Hotel
Conquistador, Inc., 597 F.2d at 1353-54 (defining the term "wages" more narrowly than income
in the withholding context).
142. Gen. Elevator Corp, 20 Cl. Ct. at 352.
143. Id. at 351 (citing Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 1362 (Ct. Cl.
1971)). Not all payments made to an employee by an employer are wages under § 3401(a).
Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1149 (Ct. Cl. 1971). Payments must
be made "for services performed" in order to be considered wages. Id. The determination of what
constitutes wages for withholding purposes is a separate and distinct question from determining
whether a payment is an economic gain to the employee that must be included within the
employee's taxable income. Id.
Whether or not payments are taxable to, or deductible by, the employee is immaterial
with regard to whether they are subject to withholding by the employer. That is a
matter between the employee and government. An employee may receive economic
benefits from his employer that are not subject to the withholding provisions of the
Code.
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must also be viewed from the standpoint of the employer's purpose in
making the payment. 144
C. THE PURCHASE OF A CONTRACT RIGHT FROM A SELF-EMPLOYED
INDIVIDUAL IS ANALOGOUS TO THE PURCHASE OF TENURE
Imposition of self-employment tax closely resembles the tax that is
imposed under FICA. 145 For purposes of determining whether there is a
duty to withhold, the term "wages" is defined much more narrowly than the
term income.146 In order to impose a duty to withhold on an institution's
payment to purchase tenure rights, the payment must be determined to have
been made for the performance of services.147 The purchase of tenure does
not constitute payment for the performance of service because, from the
standpoint of the institution, the purchase of tenure is the purchase of a
property interest unrelated to compensation for prior services.
It is clear under both state and federal law that tenure is a property
interest.148 A tenured faculty member's property interest cannot be termi-
nated without adequate cause or due process.149 The tenure property inter-
est has value separate and apart from the services which are being provided
by the faculty members. 150
The decisions in Milligan and Gump establish that when an employer is
providing payment for the purpose of terminating a contractual relationship
those payments do not constitute wages for purposes of FICA
withholding.151 In an attempt to terminate the tenured faculty member's
property interest without the necessity of due process and/or the existence
144. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 442 F.2d at 1367. Because the employer is the taxpayer "it
is the purpose of the employer that controls in determining whether payments are remuneration
under § 3401(a) for services performed." Id.
145. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
146. Gen. Elevator Corp., 20 Cl. Ct. at 351.
147. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 27 (1978). As noted by the
United States Supreme Court in Central Illinois Public Service Co., "the committee reports of the
time stated consistently that 'wages' meant remuneration 'if paid for services performed by an
employee for his employer."' Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, 2nd Sess., at 126 (1942); S.
REP. No. 77-1631, 2nd Sess., at 166 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 78-401, 1st Sess., at 22 (1943); S.
Rep. No. 78-221, 1st Sess., at 17 (1943); H.R. Rep. No. 78-510, 1st Sess., at 29 (1943)). The
Supreme Court also specifically noted that "it is one thing to say that the reimbursements
constitute income to the employees for income tax purposes, and it is quite another thing to say
that it follows therefrom that the reimbursements in 1963 were subject to withholding." Id. at 29.
"There is a gap between the premise and the conclusion and it is a wide one." Id. The Supreme
Court further noted that the requirement of withholding "is rightly much narrower than
subjectability to income taxation." Id.
148. See supra notes 73-95 and the accompanying text.
149. Morris v. Clifford, 903 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1990).
150. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1051 (D.N.D. 1999).
151. See supra notes 109-30 and accompanying text.
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of adequate cause, an institution may find it desirable to make a payment to
the faculty member to purchase the faculty member's tenure. The payment
to the faculty member is not being provided for the remuneration of past
services but instead to terminate a legitimate property interest.
The mere fact that the amount of compensation that is provided to the
tenured faculty member is based upon a past salary is not sufficient to
transform the property interest into a remuneration for services. Similar cir-
cumstances existed in Milligan and Gump. Reference to past services is
used as a benchmark to determine how much a tenured faculty member will
receive when and if they comply with the terms of the retirement
agreement. 152
D. THE CASE LAW UPON WHICH THE GOVERNMENT RELIED IS
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PURCHASE OF TENURE
To support its position in NDSU, the Government primarily relied upon
three decisions: Lane Processing Trust v. United States,153 Mayberry v.
United States,154 and Associated Electric Coop., Inc. v. United States.1
55
None of these decisions related to the purchase of a property interest.
In Lane, the taxpayer did not raise the issue of whether or not a
property interest was being purchased.156 In Lane, the taxpayer argued the
following: (1) that because the employees were owners, the payments made
to the employees were dividends and not wages; (2) that the employees
were not employees of the taxpayer; and (3) that the payments were not
bargained for.157 The Lane case did not raise the issue of whether or not the
purchase of a property interest constitutes remuneration for services.
152. See, e.g., Gump v. United States, 86 F.3d 1126, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In Gump, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the taxpayer's right to receive the pay-
ments arose from the cancellation of the relationship between Gump as an insurance agent for
Nationwide Insurance. Id. at 1128. Similarly, in Milligan, the Ninth Circuit also determined that
payments derived from the termination of a taxpayer's business are not subject to self-
employment tax. Milligan v. Comm'r, 38 F.3d 1094, 1098 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994). As noted by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the payments arose from cancellation of the agreement
and, absent cancellation of the agreement, no right to the payments existed. Gump, 86 F.3d at
1128.
153. 25 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 1994).
154. 151 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 1998).
155. 42 Fed. CI. 867 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
156. Lane Processing Trust, 25 F.3d at 662. In order to avoid liquidation, several companies
created a trust that ultimately made payments to the company's former employees after the
companies were sold. Id. at 663. The taxpayers asserted that distributions by the trust to former
company employees were not subject to FICA or FUTA taxation. Id. at 666. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that distributions to the former employees constituted "wages" and
therefore were subject to FICA and FUTA taxation. Id.
157. Id. at 665-66.
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In Lane, the employees accepted lower wages and benefits with
knowledge that a trust had been established for their benefit, which would
be distributed once the company was profitable.15 8 At one point the com-
pany "distributed a letter to the employees, informing them of recent events
and telling them that their efforts had played an integral role in the
Companies' turnaround and that the cash from the sale [of the trust]
belonged to them."'59 In Lane, the employees at-will received additional
compensation which had been set aside to encourage continued em-
ployment.60 This is significantly different from payments to terminate a
property interest.
The Mayberry decision resulted from employment tax litigation, which
arose out of the "Continental Can settlement."161 Several Circuit Courts
split on the issue of whether or not the payments from the "Continental Can
settlement" were subject to employment taxation. 162 In Dotson v. United
States,163 the Fifth Circuit determined that the "Continental Can settlement"
awards were not subject to FICA taxation and were not wages because the
awards constituted payment on account of personal injuries or sickness
excluded and therefore were excluded from the taxpayer's income.164
Given the split of authority, the Mayberry decision has very little persuasive
value.
The Mayberry decision is also factually distinguishable from the
purchase of tenure. The Mayberry decision did not raise the issue of wheth-
er or not payment for voluntary termination of a property interest is wages.
158. Id. at 664.
159. Id.
160. Id. As noted by the Eighth Circuit, "the payments made to each employee were based
on factors traditionally used to determine the employee compensation, specifically, the value of
the services performed by the employee, the length of the employee's employment, and the
employee's prior wages." Id. at 665.
161. Mayberry v. United States, 151 F.3d 855, 857 (8th Cir. 1998). The "Continental Can
settlement" cases involve consolidated class action suits that had been initiated by 5,000 former
employees of Continental Can Company asserting that the company had interfered with the
attainment of pension rights by employees in violation of Section 510 of ERISA. Id. A settlement
fund was established to provide distribution to class members. Id. Pursuant to an agreement be-
tween the parties, the payments made to class members were subject to withholding and the
individual class members thereafter initiated refund claims seeking a recovery of the employment
taxes paid on the award. Id. The taxpayers asserted that the award was neither taxable as income
nor wages pursuant to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), which excludes from income "damages received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of
personal injuries or sickness." Id.
162. See, e.g., Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682, 686-88 (5th Cir. 1996) (determining, by
a split panel, that the payments were excluded from the taxpayer's income); Helmut v. United
States, 122 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1997) (determining that because relief under the ERISA provisions
is equitable in nature, the award was taxable).
163. 87 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 1996).
164. Dotson, 87 F.3d at 686-88.
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The Mayberry decision discussed the issue of whether the payments were
personal injury damages excluded from FICA taxation. 165 The Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded that the payments to the employees were not personal injury
damages excluded from FICA taxation. 
166
A third case relied upon by the Government to support its position that
the payment of tenure constitutes "wages" was Associated Electric Coop.,
Inc. v. United States.167 In Associated Electric Coop., all of the employees
were eligible to be provided with voluntary "early out" payments.' 68 In
contrast, institutions initiating tenure buyouts provide payments only to
people with existing property interests. Employees who do not have a pro-
tected property interest are not provided with buyouts.
Although Associated Electric Coop. involved termination of an agree-
ment with the United Mine Workers Association, the Federal Court of
Claims specifically found that buyout was also offered to non-union em-
ployees and that the right to strike was never at issue because the termi-
nation of the employees occurred prior to the date the union employees
would have had a right to strike.' 69 In other words, the Federal Court of
Claims in Associated Electric Coop. concluded that no property interest
existed and therefore the payments were subject to FICA taxation.'
70
VI. THE ALTERNATIVE DEPUTY TAXPAYER DEFENSE HAS BEEN
ELIMINATED
A. THE DEPUTY TAXPAYER CONCEPT REQUIRES AN EMPLOYER TO
HAVE CLEAR AND PRECISE NOTICE OF DUTY TO WITHHOLD
An employer may be relieved from its obligation to withhold FICA
taxes if the employer is not given clear and precise notice of a duty to
165. Mayberry, 151 F.3d at 857.
166. Id. at 858-61. The Eighth Circuit relied upon United States Supreme Court precedent
establishing that the personal injury damages are not contemplated under the provisions of
ERISA, and therefore the taxpayer's assertion that the award represented compensation for per-
sonal injury excluded from income under § 104(a)(2) was erroneous. Id. at 859.
167. 42 Fed. CI. 867 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
168. Associated Electric Coop., 42 Fed. Cl. at 870-71, 877.
169. Id. at 871-72, 877.
170. Id. at 877. The Federal Court of Claims distinguished Revenue Ruling 74-252, 1974-1
C.B. 287, which held payments that were in the nature of a property interest were not subject to
FICA taxation. Id. Although the purchase of "the right to strike" may be in the nature of a pro-
perty interest, with respect to the employees in Associated Electric Coop. the right to strike was
never at issue because the termination occurred prior to the date the right to strike would have
vested. Id.
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withhold.171 In Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States,172 the
United States Supreme Court recognized that each employer is a "deputy
tax collector" with respect to withholding of FICA and income taxes. 173
Because the employer is usually not able to recover any of the taxes that are
retroactively imposed, the United States Supreme Court has held that each
employer is entitled to clear and precise notice that there is a duty to
withhold.174 Accordingly, even though an employer might have a duty to
withhold, the IRS is not permitted to assess delinquent taxes unless the
employer had "clear and precise" notice of a duty to withhold. 175
The Application of the "Deputy Tax Collector" Doctrine has been
described by the United States Claims Court.176 In General Elevator
Corp.,177 an employer provided an allowance for travel expenses to workers
when they traveled beyond a certain distance from their home office.178
The United States Claims Court determined that the nature of the payments
was not directly related to the reimbursement of expenses and accordingly
constituted wages for the purposes of withholding and the FICA tax.179
However, the United States Claims Court held that the taxpayer was
entitled to relief. The Court of Claims determined that without "clear and
precise" notice that there is a duty to withhold, no employer could
reasonably expect that a withholding obligation existed.180
B. NDSU RECEIVED ADVICE FROM THE SSA THAT THE PURCHASE
OF TENURE DID NOT REQUIRE WITHHOLDING
In its attempt to determine whether or not it had a duty to withhold
NDSU consulted with the SSA and the IRS.181 In early 1991, NDSU re-
searched the possible need for FICA withholding on the tenure buy-outs
being initiated by NDSU.182 NDSU took the initiative to determine the
171. Gen. Elevator Corp. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 345, 352 (Cl. Ct. 1990).
172. 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
173. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 435 U.S. at 31.
174. Id. An employer's obligation to withhold must be precisely defined and not speculative.
Id.
175. Gen. Elevator Corp., 20 Cl. Ct. at 532.
176. Id. at 535.
177. 20 Cl. Ct. 345 (Cl. Ct. 1990).
178. Gen. Elevator Corp., 20 Cl. Ct. at 347.
179. Id. at 354.
180. Id. at 353-54. After reviewing the pertinent revenue rulings, the Court of Claims sum-
marized that the rulings "leave a speculative gap where plaintiff, when faced with ambiguous or
inapplicable interpretations, cannot reasonably be held to have received a degree of notice the law
requires." Id. at 354.
181. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1046 (D.N.D. 1999).
182. Id.
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status of those payments by visiting with the IRS office in Fargo. 183 The
IRS did not provide an answer to NDSU's question.184
NDSU then initiated contact with the SSA personnel in Fargo, North
Dakota, and presented them with the same issue it had presented to the
IRS.185 NDSU carefully explained the nature of faculty tenure and was told
that the SSA agent would consult with higher and more knowledgeable
SSA personnel and return with an answer. The SSA subsequently advised
NDSU in writing that payments to secure the release of the unexpired
contract of employment are not considered wages. 186 The letter from the
SSA provided that "according to its operations manual 'a payment to secure
the release of an unexpired contract of employment is not considered
wages."1 87 What this means is that the payment is not considered in de-
termining benefit amounts, nor is it used for deduction of benefit purposes.
This type of payment would have no effect on an individual's social se-
curity eligibility or their entitlement.
The letter made reference to SSA's Program Administration Manual.
That regulation provides the following: "The purchase of contract pay-
ments is payments to secure the release of an unexpired contract of em-
ployment, either by an agreement between the employee and the employer,
or as the result of a judgment. These payments are not in remuneration for
employment."' 88
Despite NDSU's assertion of the "Deputy Tax Collector" defense, the
district court determined that it was not applicable to NDSU.189 The district
court noted that prior to 1991, NDSU had withheld FICA taxes from early
retirement payments.190 NDSU did not begin to question the withholding
practice until several prospective retirees began to question the practice and
NDSU thereafter initiated research to change its position.191 The "Deputy
Tax Collector" defense only applies to the employer's portion of the FICA
tax. 19 2
In NDSU, the "Deputy Tax Collector" defense only applied to pay-
ments made to administrators and not to payments made to tenured faculty
183. Id.
184. Id. 1046-47.
185. Id. at 1047.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL, RS
01401.430.
189. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1050 (D.N.D. 1999).
190. Id. at 1049-50.
191. Id. at 1050.
192. H.B. & R, Inc. v. United States, 229 F.3d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 2000).
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members because the court had already determined that the tenured faculty
members were relinquishing the property interest.193 The Eighth Circuit
distinguished administrators from tenured faculty members and noted that
there was no basis for NDSU to stop withholding payments from admini-
strators.194 The Eighth Circuit further noted that the information requested
from the SSA was directed toward the tenure buy-out program and did not
include a request regarding the administrators who also participated in the
program.195 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the notice to withhold with
respect to administrators was clear in 1991.196
VII. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT CONFIRMED THAT PAYMENTS MADE
TO PURCHASE TENURE ARE NOT "WAGES" SUBJECT TO
FICA TAXATION
The Eighth Circuit initiated a review of the United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota's decision determining that early retirement
payments made to tenured faculty members were not wages. 197 The Eighth
Circuit acknowledged that the term "wages" and the term "employment"
are broadly defined within the context of FICA taxation. 198 However, the
Eighth Circuit also noted that not all payments that are made by employers
to employees constitute wages and that many items which qualify as in-
come to an employee are clearly not within the definition of wages.199 The
Eighth Circuit summarized that although wages and employment are to be
read broadly in the context of FICA taxation, "the payments must be re-
muneration for services provided by the employee to his employer to be
subject to FICA taxes." 200
The Eighth Circuit noted that the Internal Revenue Service itself has
recognized that payments made to terminate rights under a contract are not
wages for FICA taxation purposes. 201 Payments made to terminate a
193. N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 608-09 (8th Cir. 2001).
194. Id. at 609.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 599.
198. Id. at 603.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 604. The Eighth Circuit noted that the IRS has previously indicated payments to
relinquish rights under a contract are not "wages" for FICA purposes. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 58-
301, 1958-1 C.B. 23, 1958 W.L. 10630) (2004)). As noted by the Eighth Circuit, the only federal
district court case that appears to have ever addressed the issue of whether FICA taxes applied to
payments to tenured faculty for release of their tenure rights is an unpublished decision from the
Southern District of Texas. Id. at n.5 (citing Slotta v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., No. G-93-92, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21205 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1994)).
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contract need to be distinguished from payments made pursuant to an em-
ployment contract as payments for past services and payments for seniority
rights, which are all treated as wages for FICA purposes by the Internal
Revenue Service. 202 The Eighth Circuit therefore characterized the deter-
minative issue as "whether the payments made under NDSU's Early Re-
tirement Program to tenured faculty in exchange for release of the faculty's
tenure rights are payments to relinquish contractual or property rights,
payments pursuant to a contractual agreement, payments for past services,
or something else."
203
In the NDSU decision, both parties agreed that tenure was a protected
property right.204 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged tenured faculty
members have not only a constitutional right to procedural due process
rights to be free but also have substantive due process rights that prevent the
arbitrary and capricious discharge of the faculty member.
205
The Eighth Circuit noted that although tenure cannot be bought and
sold at an open market, it nonetheless has economic value. 206 Despite the
lack of market, tenure has significant value to the faculty member to whom
tenure has been granted. 207 Additionally, tenure is a relationship that de-
velops gradually, and transforms the "at will relationship" between the
university and the faculty member into a subsequent "tenured relation-
ship." 208 A tenured position is a relationship that is significantly different
from a non-tenured relationship and provides the faculty member with aca-
demic freedom that encourages the expression of new ideas without the fear
of retribution. 209
After determining that payments made to tenured faculty members
were provided in the exchange for the tenured faculty member's relin-
quishment of their contractual and constitutionally protected tenure rights,
the Eighth Circuit held that the payments were not remuneration for ser-
vices; the payments were not "wages." 210 Because the payments are not
remuneration for services, the payments are not subject to FICA taxation.
211
202. Id. at 604.







210. Id. at 607.
211. Id.
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VIII. THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HAS EXPRESSED ITS
RELUCTANCE TO FOLLOW THE NDSU DECISION OUTSIDE
OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Subsequent to the Eighth Circuit's decision in NDSU, the IRS an-
nounced its non-acquiescence. On December 31, 2002, the Office of Chief
Counsel for the Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service,
noted its disagreement with the NDSU decision. 212 After noting its disa-
greement with the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Office of the Chief
Counsel issued the following recommendation:
Non-acquiescence.
Although we disagree with the decision of the Court, we recognize
the precedential effect of the decision to cases appealable to the
Eighth Circuit, and therefore will follow it within that circuit only
with respect to cases that have the exact facts as this case; that is,
cases involving payments to college or university professors made
in exchange for the relinquishment of their tenure rights. We will
continue to litigate our position in cases having different facts in
the Eighth Circuit, and in all cases in other circuits.213
On December 31, 2001, the Internal Revenue Service issued an
additional Internal Revenue bulletin announcing its non-acquiescence to the
NDSU decision. 214 The Internal Revenue bulletin states the following:
The Commissioner does NOT ACQUIESE in the following
decision:
North Dakota State University v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 2d
1043 (D.N.D. 1999), affd. 255 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 2001).
The Internal Revenue Service, through its Internal Revenue bulletin
and through the Office of Chief Counsel, clearly expressed the intent of the
Internal Revenue Service not to follow the decision issued by the Eighth
Circuit in NDSU.
212. Action on Decision, CC-2001-08 (Dec. 31, 2001) available at http://www.unclefed.com
/ForTaxProfs/irs-aod/aodl -08.pdf.
213. Id.
214. 2001-53 I.R.B. 631 (Dec. 31, 2001).
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IX. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit has recognized that the unique nature of tenure that
gives rise to the existence of a property interest. Tenure provides faculty
members with the freedom of expression essential to the free exchange of
ideas and encourages the development of new ideas without the fear of
retribution against the faculty member. It is the unique nature of tenure that
compels the conclusion that the purchase of a faculty member's tenure is
not a remuneration for services but is instead the purchase by the institution,
from the employee, of a valuable property interest. As such, a payment
made to purchase a faculty member's tenure is not "wages" and is not
subject to FICA taxation.
